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Starr: Article 3: Commercial Paper

Article 3: Commercial Paper*
By WILLIAM F. STARR**
Article 3 represents the first real re-examination and revision of the
law of commercial paper in over sixty years. During that time the use of
coimmercial paper has expanded tremendously, not only quantitatively but,
even more so, proportionately. Deposit credit has become the currency of
the nation and the check the medium of exchange. To a large extent article
3 covers the ground of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law but with
a new organization. However, two large segments have been split off and
placed in more congenial surroundings in other articles of the Code. Thus
the bearer bond, which found the rules designed for short term commercial
paper unduly restrictive, has been transferred to article 8 on Investment
Securities where it joins stock certificates, registered bonds, equipment trust
certificates and the like. Also the bank collection process has grown to such
magnitude that it needs separate treatment, which is provided in article 4.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (hereinafter cited as UNIL)
was the first great project of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. It was promulgated in 1896. Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, and New York enacted it the following year. Montana approved it
in 1903 and by the end of' that year it had been adopted by twenty states.
By 1924 it had been enacted in forty-eight states and by 1930 in all of the
United States Territories. The drafting was largely the work of John J.
Crawford, Esquire, of New York, who had as patterns the British Bill of
Exchange Act of 1882 and an earlier codification in California. It has
been said to be largely a codification of the common law, but Professor
Beutel has challenged, somewhat persuasively, the idea that there was much
"common law," because nearly all decisional law was affected by fragmentary legislation in all states, each bit an ad hoc treatment of a particular
pressing problem. In any event the situation was chaotic.
Unlike the Code, prepared in the floodlight of publicity, the UNIL may
almost be said to have been prepared in chambers. It does not appear that
the UNIL came to the attention of Dean Ames of Harvard, a leading
authority, until after it was promulgated. This is the more unfortunate because, whatever the merit of some of his solutions, he pointed rather effectively to a number of trouble spots in the act. But with all its faults, and
it has a number, the UNIL was a most substantial improvement. Today no
one could be found who would contend that it should not have been adopted.
It would have served even better to bring order out of chaos had it not been
*Author's note. This article is an adaption of a part of the Report to the Connecticut
General Assembly, January 1959 Session, prepared by the author for the Assembly'8 Commission to Study and Report upon the Uniform Commercial Code. The
author is indebted to William Conklin, Editor in Chief of the Montana Law Re-

view, for his careful research and collection of the Montana materials. The views
expressed, however, are the responsibility of the author.
For convenience, the section numbers of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law have been retained in the text, with footnote reference to the parallel Montana statute section numbers.
**Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; A.B. 192, Harvard
College; LL.B. 1932, University of Washington; J.S.D. 1935, Yale University:
Secretary and member of the Connecticut Commission to Study and Report upon
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1953 to date,
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for a curious myopia which for many years led court and counsel completely to overlook it in about thirty per cent of the cases. Some of those precedents still contribute to present uncertainty. We are more statute conscious today.
Except for the segments diverted to other articles of the Code, article
3 covers most of the area covered by the UNIL. However, it omits as obsolete UNIL sections 161-1701 which provide for "acceptance for honor,"
a practice which died out with the growth of rapid communication. It also
omits section 135' which provides that an unconditional promise in writing
to accept a bill, made before the bill is issued, "is deemed an actual acceptance" in favor of certain persons who rely upon it; this is known as" virtual
acceptance." By reason of the omission from the Code such a promise will
no longer be an "acceptance" but the promisor may be liable for breach of
his promise to accept. Whatever need there is for this is served by article
5 on Letters of Credit. On the other hand, while article 3 omits for various
reasons certain matters covered by the UNIL, it does cover a number of matters not now covered by the UNIL or by any uniform legislation.
The organization of the Code is an improvement. As a single example,
of the 196 sections of the UNIL, no less than 67 are devoted to presentment,
notice of dishonor and protest., The Code organizes this material in 11 main
sections, each with some subdivisions. Altogether apart from any reduction
in the total number of provisions, and there is some, clarity and certainty
are served by havink the rules properly grouped.
Article 3, like other articles of the Code, is more problem conscious
than conceptualistic. It rewrites the UNIL but to a very considerable degree it seeks to reach more surely the same result that has been reached,
or, in some cases, should be reached, under the older act. The sections of
article 3 fall roughly-but with some over-lapping-into three classes:
(1) clarification; (2) change of policy; and (3) new coverage. The following discussion under these main headings is illustrative rather than exhaustive and is designed to show the difference in approach under the two
statutes.
CLARIFICATION
Many sections of the article differ from the UNIL primarily in an effort to eliminate ambiguities and resolve conflicts which have developed.
The results, although reached more surely, do not necessarily differ for the
most part from results which could be reached under the UNIL. In all of
these examples there has been some trouble under the UNIL. Section 3-110
of the Code makes it clear that the following instruments are payable "to
order" and not "to bearer": an instrument payable both to order and to
bearer unless the words to bearer are hand written or typewritten; and one
payable to the order of a trust, an estate, or an unincorporated association.
It also recognizes the rule of many countries that if an instrument, otherwise merely payable to a named payee, is marked "Exchange" it is payable
A more detailed discussion of other clarifications follows.
to his "order."
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, §§ 55-1401 to -1410.
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Acceleration
The UNIL does not handle well the problem of the acceleration clause.
A promissory note, otherwise payable at a fixed time, may contain a provision for acceleration of the maturity; the acceleration may be in terms
automatic or it may be at the option of the holder. The holder may be
authorized to accelerate "at will" or "on demand" (often referred to as
"at his whim"), or when he "deems himself insecure," or on maker's default in the payment of principal or interest, or if the maker fails to provide
security or keep security "good."
Now the vice of the acceleration clause, unless kept within due bounds,
is that its exercise defeats the expectations of the borrower who is apt to
suppose that he has arranged his financing until the specified maturity.
This is particularly so if acceleration may be "at the whim" of the holder,
or whenever the holder "deems himself insecure" unless the obligation of
good faith is imposed. It is not so objectionable if acceleration depends
upon something in the nature of a default by the borrower because avoidance, at least in a legal sense, is then within his control.
Even where the acceleration clause is perhaps intended to depend upon
something in the nature of a default by the obligors the Supreme Court of
Montana has found it objectionable. In Great Falls National Bank v.
Young" a note was held to be non-negotiable by reason of a clause which
read: " [the parties] agree that in the event of insolvency of either makers
or indorsers, or the institution of suit or attachment against them or either
of them, or the mortgaging of any property by the makers or indorsers, this
note may be declared immediately due and payable." This clause is particularly objectionable in that the financial difficulties of a transferorindorser would seem to entitle the transferee to accelerate against a solvent
maker. However, the court indicated that acceleration on the insolvency of
the maker would be equally objectionable to negotiability and seems to have
assumed that it would give the holder uncontrolled discretion to accelerate
at will. In the subsequent case of Anderson v. Border' the court said that
acceleration on insolvency of the maker renders the instrument non-negotiable, but the decision was rested upon another point.
In general the acceleration clause raises questions of interpretation on
which the UNIL throws no light at all; and it raises questions as to the
effect upon the negotiability of the instrument for which the UNIL provides inadequate answers.
Under UNIL section 1' an instrument to be negotiable must, among
other things, be payable "on demand" or "at a fixed or determinable future time"; and it must be for a, "sum certain in money." Section 2' provides that the sum is sufficiently certain although there is provision for
acceleration upon default in the payment of principal or interest. It does
not say that acceleration on other contingencies would render the sum uncertain but provides no sanction for any other acceleration.
With respect to certainty as to time of payment the only provision
67 Mont. 328, 215 Pac. 651 (1923).
'87 Mont. 4, 285 Pac. 174 (1930).
&R.C.M.1947, § 55-201.
cR.C.M. 1947, § 55-202.
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which may cover the matter is in section 4' which provides that an instrument is payable at a determinable future time "which is expressed to be
payable ...

(2) on or before a fixed or determinable future time specified

therein." This would seem to provide a sanction for the acceleration clause
were it not for two difficulties: (1) the language "expressed to be payable" seems to suggest that what is meant is a note which reads, "On or
before (a certain date) I promise to pay" etc., and the customary acceleration clause does not so read; and (2) both before the UNIL, and also under
it, a note which is payable "on or before" a certain date gives the maker
an option to pay before the date but it does not give the holder an option
to call for payment before maturity. But even if the draftsman might be
supposed to have used so well known an expression, with so definite a
meaning, to describe acceleration clauses in general, it is to be noted that
it equally approves every manner of acceleration clause whereas UNTIL
section 2' gives affirmative approval only to acceleration on default.
A further argument that the UNIL approves the acceleration clause
in general runs like this: an instrument payable on demand is approved
and one payable at a fixed or determinable future time is approved; how
can two certainties make an uncertainty? The trouble is that the UNIL
does not say that an instrument payable on demand is one payable at a
fixed or determinable future time. All it does is approve it. The combination has the vice discussed above.
But the trouble with all these arguments under the UNIL is that
neither the UNIL nor the arguments ever come to grips with the basic
problem. Contrast the simplicity of the Code. Section 3-109 provides
that an instrument is payable at a definite time if it is payable at a definite
time subject to any acceleration. Thus all acceleration clauses are approved to this extent. However, section 1-208, applicable to all articles of
the Code, provides that a term providing for acceleration "at will" or when
one "deems himself insecure" or words of similar import "shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."
Payee as Holder in Due Course
At common law there was no question but that the payee could be an
innocent purchaser for value in good faith and before maturity, that favored character known under the UNIL as a "holder in due course," who,
because of his many virtues, takes a negotiable instrument free of certain
claims and defenses. The UNIL introduced a controversy of a highly technical nature and yet there is not the slightest evidence that the draftsman
of the UNIL gave the matter a passing thought.
The argument that the payee just cannot be a holder in due course
under the UNIL is based upon several widely separated sections. Section
191' defines "issue" as "the first delivery of an instrument, complete in
form, to a person who takes it as holder." This neatly describes a payee
although it also includes the first bearer of a bearer instrument. By see7

R.C.M. 1947, § 55-204.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 55-202.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 55-102.
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tion 5 2 (4 )' a holder in due course is one who has taken an instrument
upon the condition, among others, "that at the time it was negotiatedto him
he had not notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating it." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus it seems by implication the holder in due course takes by negotiation and therefore not
by issue. And finally section 30" provides, among other things, that an
instrument payable "to order" is "negotiated by the indorsement of the
holder completed by delivery." Section 14' and 16' are also relied upon
to strengthen this inference. Thus negotiation of an order instrument
requires an indorsement and the payee certainly does not take by indorsement. One may well question whether the draftsman would have left the
matter of reversing the common law to inferences from so widely separated
sections had that been his objective. Moreover, notwithstanding its many
excellencies, one cannot find in the UNIL internal evidence that it was
drafted with such technical perfection as to justify the inference drawn
from these separated sections. Both layman and lawyer not infrequently
use the word "negotiate" as a substitute for transfer or deliver. However
that may be, the courts are divided on the issue.
Rather typically the Code approaches the problem directly, aided, of
course, by the experience under the UNIL. Section 3-302(2) simply states
that the payee can be a holder in due course. This should enable all parties
to give their undivided attention to the question whether the particular
payee is in fact a holder in due course. The official comments to section
3-302 give seven illustrations of situations in which he would so qualify.
The Code would not change the present law of Montana on the point,
for in Merchant's National Bank of Billings v. Smith" in a well-reasoned
opinion the court held that the UNIL had not changed the common law as
expressed in American Exchange National Bank v. Ulm."5 The court
observes, among other things, that under the UNIL a payee can be a
holder and that every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course.
The "Shelter" Provision and Reacquisition
For his own protection the holder in due course must be able to invest his transferee with all of his rights and privileges even though the
latter takes with knowledge of the defenses and claims from which the
holder in due course took free. This is not because of any tender solicitude
for the transferee but because otherwise a holder in due course might find
himself a holder of an instrument on which he could collect but which
he could not sell.- However, the necessities of the holder in due course
do not require that his sheltered market include, for example, a party to
the fraud if such there were.
Both UNIL section 58' and Code section 3-201' exclude from the
shelter "a party to the fraud or illegality." UNIL section 121 also helps
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-502.
"1R.C.M. 1947, § 55-401.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-214.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-216.
"59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 523 (1921).
'21 Mont. 440, 54 Pac. 563 (1898).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-508.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-903.
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by providing that when a party secondarily liable pays "he is remitted
to his former rights as regards all prior parties."
Section 121 applies to
the prior holder; and the exclusion of the "party to the fraud" presumably covers such a party whether prior holder or not.
However, under the UNIL section 121 there is a possibility of injustice
in the exceptional case. An innocent donee from a fraudulent payee may
indorse and sell at a discount to a holder in due course. Later he may be
required to pay the face amount. To the extent that he is returning what
he received we need not concern ourselves for him; but to the extent of
his commitment for a greater amount he should be as much protected as
any other party who acts in reliance upon the face of the paper and the
rules of negotiability. He is not a party to any fraud. If he is remitted
to the rights he had before he sold the paper he is subject to the maker's
defense against the payee. It is difficult to protect him under the UNIL.
The Code handles the matter better. Like the UNIL it excludes the
party to the fraud but it omits the clause remitting the reacquirer to his
former rights. Section 3-201(1) substitutes the direct statement that one
"who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against" the instrument "cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in
due course."
Section 1-201(25) makes it clear that he will not have had
notice unless he actually knew or truly should have known. This clarification covers better the exceptional case and in all cases is easier to apply.
Consideration and Value
The Code recognizes the distinction between consideration and value.
Consideration is important only on the issue whether the promise of a
party can be enforced against him by one who does not have the rights of
the holder in due course. Value is important on the issue whether a holder
qualifies as a particular kind of holder. The UNIL does not make the
distinction clear. UNIL section 28"' provides that absence or failure of
consideration is matter of defense against anyone not a holder in due
course. Section 25' provides that value is anything sufficient to support
a simple contract and includes antecedent debt, without mentioning whose
antecedent debt is meant.
In Connecticut a distinction has been drawn between the two concepts.
In Rockville Nat. Bank v. Citizens Gas Light Co.,' it was held that the
bank took for "value" when it took in pledge bearer bonds wrongfully
pledged to secure the pledgor's unmatured antecedent debt; there was no
agreement to extend the time, nor, at the time the security was pledged,
could the bank have taken any steps to collect the debt if the debtor had
refused to accede to its request for security. In Linvitz v. Galeckis,"' a wife
gave her own demand promissory note direct to her husband's creditor as
payee, as collateral for the husband's debt; the husband's debt had matured but there was no agreement to extend the time of payment to the
husband. It was held that the wife's promise was unenforceable for want
"'R.C.M.1947, § 55-305.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-302.
'072 Conn. 576, 45 Ati. 361 (1900).
'110 Conn. 174, 147 At. 592 (1929).
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of consideration. Some courts have reached a different conclusion by the
application of section 25 with its statement that antecedent debt is value.
The Code makes the matter clear in all situations. It would reverse
the result of the Linvitz case; it recognizes that it was a question of consideration but it provides in section 3-408 that "no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as
security for an antecedent obligation of any kind."
It also makes the
result clear where the issue is one of "value"; section 3-303 provides that
the holder takes the instrument for value when he takes it "in payment
of or as security for an antecedent claim against any person whether or not
the claim is due." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Montana cases are in accord with The Rockville National Bank case,
above, holding that the transferee of a negotiable instrument takes it for
"value" whether he takes it in substitution for an antecedent debt,' or
merely as collateral security for it.'
On the other hand, with respect to the problem of Linvitz v. Galeckis,
above, the situation is not entirely clear. The problem in Farmers' and
Miners' State Bank v. Probst' is similar but not precisely the same. One
not otherwise obligated delivered to the payee-bank his demand promissory
note as collateral for another's matured obligation. He was held liable.
Had the court said merely that these facts alone made the maker liable the
case would be contra to the Linvitz case. But the court stressed other facts.
The purpose of defendant, maker of the demand note, was to obtain the
release of an accommodation maker of the other note and the payee-bank
understood this. While the court does not quite say that the accommodation
maker was legally released from liability and that this was consideration
for defendant's promise, it does say that in reliance on defendant's demand
note the payee-bank allowed the accommodation maker to withdraw all his
funds from the bank preparatory to moving to California. Since the court
stresses the anticipated reliance upon the demand note the holding cannot
be said to be contra to that of the Linvitz case. Section 3-408 would confirm the decision in the Farmers' Bank case but it would make irrelevant
any facts except the intentional delivery of the demand note as collateral.
The Holder in Due Course "Takes," not "Holds" an Instrument
Free from "Any Defect of Title of PriorParties"
Another typical clarification with respect to a matter which, fortunately, has caused little difficulty, is found in the distinction between Code
section 3-305 and UNIL section 57.' UNIL section 57 provides that a holder
in due course "holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior
parties." Code section 3-305 clarifies this in two respects. In the first
place it substitutes for "defect of title" a clearer, simpler, and more compre"State Bank of Moore v. Forsyth, 41 Mont. 249, 108 Pac. 914 (1910) ; First State
Bank of Musigbrod, 83 Mont. 68, 88, 271 Pac. 695, 703 (1928).
"First National Bank of Lewistown v. Wilson, 57 Mbnt. 384, 188 Pac. 371 (1920).
Sathre v. Rolfe, 31 Mont. 85, 77 Pac. 431 (1904), arising at common law, is not
contra, for there the transfer was by way of common law assignment and not by
indorsement
"81 Mont. 248, 263 Pac. 693 (1928).
R.C.M.1947 § 55-507.
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hensive expression, "all claims to it on the part of any person." In the
second place it substitutes "takes" for "holds" because it is more accurate.
The holder in due course "takes" the instrument free from such claims,
but whether he continues to "hold" it free of them depends upon what
happens after he takes; a "prior party" might become the equitable owner
by subsequent dealings with the holder in due course.
1959]

Security and the Note
Two aspects of the relationship between a note and its security are of
special interest in Montana.
Suretyship Defenses
In Merchants' National Bank of Billings v. Smith' the holder of a note
released collateral without obtaining the consent of one known to him to
be an accommodation maker. At common law the accommodation maker
would have been released pro tanto. It was held that the UNIL had eliminated this suretyship defense. The argument for the position was the one
frequently accepted for denying an accommodation maker the suretyship defense of extension of time to the principal debtor.' It must be conceded
that the argument fits the one situation as well as the other. However, if
limited to the extension of time defense it might be said that it is a case
of questionable logic reaching an acceptable result. It is debatable whether
a surety should be held discharged by extension of time to his principal;
it might be preferable to leave him to his own resources, to let him claim
exoneration or let him pay and seek reimbursement even though it deprives
his principal of the benefit of his extension of time. When the interpretation of the UNIL is applied to deprive the surety of the defense of release
of collateral it really hurts him and he has no remedy to avoid the consequences.
Whatever the merits of the arguments, article 3, section 3-606, incorporates the suretyship defenses of extension of time and release of collateral and extends the benefits to makers as well as parties secondarily
liable. The benefit is somewhat restricted by a limitation as to oral proof
in section 3-415.
Notes Secured by Mortgage
In Cornish v. Woolverton ' which arose at common law, a note otherwise negotiable was held to be non-negotiable if it were secured by a mort"59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 532 (1921).
OBriefly summarized, the argument that the UNIL eliminates the suretyship defenses so far as the accommodation maker is concerned is: (1) No section of the
UNIL deals expressly with discharge of primary parties, makers and acceptors;
therefore these parties are discharged only by discharge of the instrument; (2)
section 119 (R.C.M- 1947, § 55-901) is exhaustive of the ways in which an instrument may be discharged and it says nothing about extension of time or release of
collateral; (3) subsection 4 of section 119 does not incorporate the suretyship defenses. The last point may be well taken since section 119 deals only with discharge of instruments and an extension of time or release of collateral at common
law discharges parties rather than instruments. The other two points are questionable. The UNIL recognizes in section 196 (R.C.M. 1947, § 55-107) that its coverage is not quite complete and section 119 does not purport to be exhaustive. Furthermore it is not true that a maker cannot be discharged under the UNIL except
by discharge of the instrument; for example, under section 122 (R.C.M. 1947,
§ 55-904) he may be discharged by renunciation.
'23 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4 (1905).
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gage and if it included a recital to that effect; and in Buhler v. Loftus,'
arising under the UNIL, the same result was reached even though the
note did not contain such recital. But such a note, in fact secured by mortgage but containing no recital to that effect, was held negotiable in the
hands of an innocent purchaser who did not know of the mortgage.'
The reasons relied upon for this effect of the mortgage security were
primarily two:
(a) A statute providing, "Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one
transaction, are to be taken together."" This is a codification of a common
law rule recognized almost everywhere but seldom applied to render nonnegotiable a note secured by mortgage. This was the basis of the decision
in Cornish v. Woolverton.
(b) A statutory provision to the effect that (with some exceptions)
a debt secured by mortgage can be enforced only by foreclosure, in which
The statute is
action, however, a deficiency judgment can be obtained.'
found in a few other states, including California, Idaho and Utah. Buhler
v. Loftus relied upon this statute.
The result of such a statute, said the California court in National
Hardwood Co. v. Sherwood,' is to make "the personal liability upon such
note . . . contingent and dependent upon there being a deficiency in the

proceeds of the mortgaged premises to pay the note upon a foreclosure
sale.""' With respect, this rationalization seems to the writer neither hecessary nor particularly appropriate. He thinks of the situation as one in
which the maker incurred an unconditional obligation to pay the face
amount of the note if it took his last non-exempt asset but with the requirement that the holder apply the security to that payment before looking to
other assets. This is not the kind of "condition" which should render a
note unsuitable for circulation as would a condition which might relieve
the maker from any obligation to pay without the holder being in fact paid.
The mortgage statute seems to affect the remedy rather than render the
promise conditional.
Be that as it may be, in 1923 several states with such a mortgage
statute and interpretation undertook to remedy the evil, for it must be
regarded as an evil to subject the innocent purchaser to unknown defenses
merely because the note was made more acceptable in the market by reason
of security. Montana and Idaho in 1923 added the following subsection to
section 5 of the UNIL : "An instrument otherwise negotiable in character is
not affected by the fact that it was at the time of the execution or subsequently secured by mortgage on real or personal property.'
It is to be noted that it is provided that it is the instrument and not
merely the negotiability of the instrument which is not to be affected by
the mortgage. This avoids the objection to negotiability raised in Cornish
'53 Mont. 546, 165 Pac. 601 (1917).
"0Wood v. F.guson, 71 Mont. 540, 230 Pac. 592 (1924).

s'R.C.M. 1947, § 13-7-8.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-GOl.

"165 Cal. 1, 130 Pac. 881 (1913.).
uId., 130 Pac. at 883.
" R.C.M. 1947, § 55-205.
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v. Woolverto%, above, but it also bars construing note and mortgage to1959]

gether for any other purpose. It seems to exempt the negotiable debt
from the operation of the statute which requires application of the mortgage security to payment of the debt before resort to other assets of the
obligor. In a comment in 3 Montana Law Review 89 in 1942, Arthur T.
Ratcliffe questioned whether the amendment resolves enough problems.
The California amendment' to UNIL section 184' in 1923 and the Utah
amendment ' of UNIL section 5' in 1925 both provide that the negotiability
of an instrument is not affected by the fact or recital of mortgage security.
This would seem a better attack on the problem and would not appear to
eliminate what may be regarded as a salutary requirement that the mortgaged property be first applied to payment of the debt.
Were Montana to enact article 3 and repeal the UNIL together with
the 1923 amendment, the situation with respect to a note otherwise negotiable but secured by mortgage, executed as part of the same transaction,
would seem to the writer to be as follows:
(a) The note and mortgage would be read together, as in Cornish v.
Woolverton. Indeed, under section 3-119(1) the terms of the note may be
"modified or affected" by the mortgage as between maker and immediate
obligee and as against a transferee with notice. However, a holder in due
course is not affected by any limitation arising out of the mortgage unless he had notice of the limitation when he took the instrument.
(b)
The note should be held negotiable. Section 3-105(1) (e) provides that a promise is not made conditional by a recital that it is "secured,
whether by mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise."
See also section
3-119(2).
Article 3 is not directed specifically to the Montana type statute limiting the remedy to foreclosure. If the writer's analysis is sound that statute
affects only the remedy and does not render the promise conditional.
Article 3 is not concerned with whether the holder must proceed by foreclosure or may proceed by suit with or without' attachment before judgment. Of course the UNIL is no more concerned with this matter. It
seems to the writer that it would be much more difficult for a court to
reach the result in Buhler v. Loftus, above, under article 3 than under the
ITNIL. It may not be wholly impossible. In view of the history in Montana
and elsewhere this problem needs further study and it is possible that it
would be a wise precaution to have a specific provision to deal with it in
the few states whicl require foreclosure.
(c)
If article 3 were adopted without a special provision as discussed
in (b) above, it is the writer's opinion that the foreclosure statute would
apply. This seems to be contra to the implication of Montana's 1923 amendment to the UNIL.
"Laws of California 1923, ch. 98, § 3265, at 193. Also set forth in BEuTEL, BRANNAN'S NE)GOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW

201 (7th ed. 1948).

"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1701.
'Laws of Utah 1925, ch. 2, § 1, at 2. Also set forth in BEUTEL,
TIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW 116 (7th ed. 1948).

BRANNAN'S

Nzno-

M

R.C.M. 1947, § 55-205.
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There are a number of changes of policy, some major and some minor,
made in the light of experience and changing times. UNIL section 129'
requires "protest" to charge secondary parties upon the dishonor of a
bill which appears on its face to be drawn in one state and payable in another. Today this seems to be an unnecessary complication in handling
paper within the country. For this reason Code section 3-501 requires
protest only in international transactions where this formal evidence of
dishonor still serves a useful purpose. In all other cases simple notice of
dishonor suffices.
Under the UNIL there has developed a court-made limit of one day
after receipt of a check for presentment to charge secondary parties, with
some uncertain extension to permit collection through banking channels."
This has proved to be unduly restrictive for department stores and large
businesses clearing many checks after the first of the month, and also for
farmers and others at a distance from a bank. Section 3-503 provides that,
absent special circumstances, presentment to charge a drawer of a check is
deemed reasonable if within 30 days of issue and to charge an indorser if
within 7 days of his indorsement. A more detailed discussion of other
changes of policy follows.
The Restrictive Indorsement
UNIL section 36" and Code section 3-205 are very nearly the same in
their listing of the indorsements which are "restrictive."
Both include
(though with slightly different emphasis) (1) an indorsement which purports to prohibit further transfer; (2) an indorsement to an agent for the
transferor although the Code gives some specific examples; (3) an indorsement to one for the benefit of the indorser or a third party. The
Code includes the "conditional" indorsement which the UNIL section 39"
covers separately.
The substantial difference between the two acts is to be found in their
provisions as to the effects of the restrictive indorsement. Under UNIL
section 47" "an instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed." The implication is clear
that the restrictive indorsement renders the instrument no longer negotiable. And yet it would seem that the restrictive indorsee, in case he
brings action, should have the benefit of a presumption of consideration,
for example, which would not be true if the implication were given literal
effect. The real object no doubt was merely to prevent loss to the restrictive indorser of his continued interest and this could be better handled
otherwise. UNIL section 37' outlines the rights of the restrictive indorsee
-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1004.
"Montana has recognized that "a person tendering payment by check is deemed to
have knowledge of the usual and customary method of making presentment through
a bank at the place to which the check is sent." BlIckwelder v. Fergus Motor Co.,
80 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734, 739 (1927).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-407.
3
' R.C.M. 1947, § 55-410.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-418.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-408.
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which are essentially those of an agent and it provides affirmatively that
all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the first indorsee under
the restrictive indorsement. This is particularly objectionable with respect
to the indorsement "to A for the benefit of B," that is, the trust indorsement. It would follow from the UNIL that if B bought the instrument
under circumstances which would make him a holder in due course, but
for his own convenience took an indorsement "to A for the benefit of B,"
that neither A nor B, nor the two together, would have the rights of a
holder in due course although they qualified in every other respect.
The Code makes a distinct change of policy. It recognizes that in the
normal course of events an instrument with restrictive indorsement is going
to travel on through several hands, if only in the course of collection. It also
recognizes that from a practical point of view the right of the restrictive
indorser to reclaim the instrument from subsequent transferees is not of
sufficient advantage to him to justify disruption of ordinary processes.
With the Federal Deposit Insurance program the occasion for his needing
such protection may not often arise. Accordingly section 3-206 provides
that any holder who takes under or after a restrictive indorsement (including a conditional one) must apply whatever he gives for the instrument
consistently with the indorsement but to the extent that he does so he may
be a holder in due course if he otherwise qualifies.
Furthermore, when
the instrument enters the bank collection process the first bank, known as
the depositary bank (whether it is the payor bank or not) must heed the
indorsement and act consistently with it, but an intermediate bank in the
collection process is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by the restrictive indorsement. Section 3-206(4) also provides that if the indorsement is of the trust variety, that is, for the benefit of the indorser or a
third party, the first taker under this indorsement must apply any value
given by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with
the irdorsement, but a later holder for value is neither given notice nor
otherwise affected by the indorsement unless he has knowledge that a fiduciary or other person has negotiated the instrument in any transaction for
his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.
The Code provision appears to be an improvement on the UNIL.
19591

The Special Indorsement and the Bearer Instrnment
There is a seeming conflict between U-NIL sections 9(5)' and 34" on
the one side and section 40' on the other as to the effect of a special indorsement upon a bearer instrument. The Code eliminates the conflict and in
part changes the rule. Under UNIL section 9(5) an instrument is payable
to bearer "when the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank."
See also section 34. The implication is that if the last indorsement is not
blank but special, that is, payable to a named party, then the instrument
is not payable to bearer and the indorsement of the special indorsee is essential to further negotiation. Standing alone this implication would
arise whether the instrument originally read payable to bearer -or whether
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-209.
4'R.C.M. 1947, § 55-405.
-R.C.M. 1947, J 55-411.
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it became so by a prior blank indorsement. But section 40 contradicts this
by its provision, "When an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed
specially it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery.
Standing alone this might be taken to mean that after an instrument is indorsed in blank, and thereby made payable to bearer, a subsequent special
indorsement would not require the indorsee's indorsement for further negotiation. Reconciliation has been found by some courts by applying section
40 to an instrument originally payable to bearer and limiting section 9(5)
to an instrument originally payable to order and made payable to bearer
by a blank indorsement. But there has been trouble.
UNIL section 40 no doubt was inserted to avoid the possibility of converting a bearer bond into an order instrument by a special indorsement to
the consequent dismay of the obligor who had not expected to have to worry
about indorsements when it came to payment.
The Code provides a rather practical solution to all these problems.
In the first place the bearer bond, which is covered by the UNIL, has been
transferred to article 8 on Investment Securities and there the rule of UNIL
section 40 is preserved; section 8-310 provides, "An indorsement of a security in bearer form may give notice of adverse claims (section 8-304)
but it does not otherwise affect any right to registration the holder may
possess."
With the bond removed from coverage, article 3 makes the special indorsement control negotiation whether the instrument was originally made
payable to bearer or was made so by a prior blank indorsement; this means
that under article 3 the indorsement of a special indorsee is always essential
to further negotiation."
Negotiation After Maturity
The Code makes a significant change with respect to negotiation after
maturity. UNIL section 7,' in stating when an instrument is payable on
demand, includes in its last sentence an instrument "issued, accepted or
indorsed" after maturity. This has caused some trouble. It is effect to require presentment and notice to hold an indorser who indorses after maturity? And is it possible for one to become a holder in due course, with
the right to enforce free of defenses, with respect to those who sign after
maturity? This has proved to be a trap for the unwary.
The Code solves the problem in section 3-108 by eliminating the last
sentence of UNIL section 7 which causes the trouble. And section 3-501(4)
provides affirmatively that the indorser after maturity is not entitled to
presentment, notice of dishonor, or protest.
The mere fact that an instrument is overdue should be a warning to a
prospective purchaser of the possibility of defenses even though more
often than not nonpayment is due to financial stringency. Whether it
should be equally a warning of possible adverse claims or ownership is
another question. In the English case of In re European Bank," it ap9

" UNIFORM

COMACNERCIAL

CODE

§ 3-204.

(Hereinafter

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE is

cited UCC).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-207.

'L.R. 5 ch. 358 (1870).
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pears that a manager of a bank misappropriated funds and invested them
in overdue bills of exchange. The bank, of course, had an equitable interest by way of constructive trust, but it had not traced its funds and discovered that interest at the time the manager sold the bills to an innocent
purchaser. In fact it is probable that the fraudulent manager was the only
man on earth who knew of the bank's interest at that time. It was held
that the bank could assert its equity of ownership against the innocent
purchaser. This may be said to be a holding that an overdue negotiable
instrument is less negotiable than a horse.
In contrast is the case of Gardner v. Beacon Trust Company."' Here
the beneficial owner had been induced by misrepresentation to indorse an
overdue note to a faithless agent to collect it and the agent promptly improved his opportunity by pledging it to an innocent purchaser for his
own benefit. The innocent purchaser prevailed over the defrauded transferor on the principle that one who acquires legal title for value takes free
of unknown equities-thus putting the overdue note in the same stable as
the horse. The court also invoked the principle of estoppel.
19591

The Montana case, Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Rhoades,' involves a similar problem. A purchaser of land entrusted to its purchasing
agent funds with which to pay the debt secured by a mortgage upon the
land. The debt was represented by an overdue note. The agent paid the
sum to the holder but whether he posed as payor or as purchaser is not clear.
In any case he had the holder indorse the note "without recourse" instead
of marking it paid, and he had the mortgage assigned to his own nominee
instead of released on the land records, as should have been done. Later,
representing himself to be the owner of note and mortgage, he pledged the
note to a bank for his own purposes and caused his nominee to assign the
mortgage to the bank. The purchaser of the land brought action to quiet
title and prevailed over the bank. The court said the mortgage debt was paid,
whatever the intent of the agent; it also said the purchaser of the land became the equitable owner of the mortgage and that this merged in his title to
the land. The court denied that the interest of the land purchaser was a
"latent equity," and this may indicate that it would not have followed In
Re European Bank, above, on its facts. It believed that a purchaser of
overdue paper is on inquiry; that, properly pursued, inquiry would have
disclosed the facts; and that, if necessary, inquiry should have been pursued to the point of inquiry of the record holder of title to the land.
How would article 3 of the Code handle these cases? In all three cases
the respective innocent purchasers of the paper were not holders in due
course because they did not take "without notice that it was overdue. ""'
Since they were not holders in due course they would be subject to "all
valid claims to [the instruments] on the part of any person."' Article 3,
therefore, would confirm the result reached in the English and Montana
cases and would reverse the result reached in the Gardner case in Massachusetts.
8'190 Mass. 27, 76 N.E. 455 (1906).
552 Mont. 428, 158 Pac. 832 (1916).
5
UC0 § 3-302 (c).
"UCC § 3-306(a).
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The Incomplete Ivstrument Not Delivered
Under ITNIL section 14' if an incomplete instrument is delivered in
its incoml)lete state and, after it is completed, even if contrary to the authority given, it is negotiated to a holder in due course he may enforce it as it
reads. Under section 16"' if a completed instrument is not "delivered" by
a party authorized to do so but is put into circulation by one who had no
right to do so, even by a thief, it can be enforced by a holder in due course.
(Of course there must be no forged indorsements.) Now it may be argued
-and in fact has been-that if there can be a holder in due course of an
incomplete instrument actually delivered and also of a complete instrament
not delivered it should follow that there can be a holder in due course of
an incomplete instrument not delivered. Whatever the merit of the argument, UNIL section 15' provides that under the combination no one can
enforce it against one who signed before it was put into circulation.
There is some justification for section 15. The protection of the holder
in due course must stop somewhere short of imposing an undue burden
upon others. No doubt one should have the privilege of writing his name
on a blank piece of paper without incurring the danger that he may be
held liable on a negotiable note which someone writes above his signature:
on the other hand the privilege should stop short of permitting one to write
his name on a batch of blank checks or notes unless he is required at his
peril to keep them out of circulation.
The Code, it seems to us, balances conveniences well. It eliminates
section 15 of the UNIL and it accepts the view that the holder in due course
should be protected whether the instrument is delivered while incomplete
or is completed and not delivered. But the Code makes a significant limitation. Under section 3-115 it is only if the contents of the paper at the time
of signing show that it is intended to become an instrument that the signer
can become liable to the holder in due course if the instrument gets into
circulation without the signer's delivery. He may be inviting trouble if he
signs his name on a blank sheet, but he will not, if the facts are properly
found, be held liable upon a note which is written above his signature
without his consent.
Alteration
UNIL section 124' begins with a broad provision that a material
(physical) alteration of an instrument avoids it as to all prior parties
liable thereon except those who "made, authorized or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers."
There is no explicit exception of the
alteration made by a stranger to the instrument (spoliation) although that
may be covered indirectly by the last sentence of the section to the effect
that in the hands of a holder in due course it is enforceable according to its
original tenor. There has been some trouble over it. This section makes
no distinction between a fraudulent and a non-fraudulent alteration; in
either case if material and if made by the holder the alteration avoids the
-R.C.M.
m
R.C.M.
-R.C.M.
mR.C.M.

1947,
1947,
1947,
1947,

§ 55-214.
§ 55-216.
§ 55-215.
§ 55-906.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1959

15

1959]

ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
Montana Law Review, Vol. 21 [1959], Iss. 1, Art. 3

instrument. The courts have been astute to alleviate the harshness of the
rule by permitting recovery on the underlying obligation (if any) if the
alteration is non-fraudulent.
Code section 3-407 handles the matter rather well. No alteration
(physical) discharges any party unless it is made by the holder and is
both fraudulent and material. Spoliation does not avoid the instrument.
In this connection it should be observed that the Code classifies as "alteration" the filling up of a blank in a manner not authorized. As under
the IJNIL the subsequent holder in due course in all cases may enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor; and with respect to the kind
of alteration involved in the completing of the incomplete instrument, the
subsequent holder in due course can enforce it as completed.'
Miles City Bank v. Askin' presents the question of the effect of an
alteration upon the transferee 's qualifying as a holder in due course. The
court rejects the presumption, found in some states, that an alteration was
made before delivery. It does not take the position that an alteration,
whether visible or not, prevents the instrument from being "regular upon
its face" within the requirement of subsection 1 of UNIL section 52,"
which sets forth the requirements for a holder in due course; however, it
would submit to the jury the question whether an "alteration" was "so
manifest and visible as to reasonably impart notice to plaintiff of an irregularity of and infirmity in the check." This is consistent with section
3-304(1) (a) of the Code, which provides that a purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense "if the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible
evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into
question its validity, terms or ownership."
Effect of Delay in Presentment
There are three classes of persons who, because of the essential similarity of their positions, should be entitled to equal treatment, who are nevertheless treated most unequally under the UNIL.
The effect of the holder's undue and unexcused delay in presenting
an instrument for payment is:
(1) to discharge to the extent of his loss the drawer of a check;'
(2) to discharge fully the drawer of a bill of exchange not a check ;"
(3) to discharge not at all the maker of a note which by its terms is
"payable at a bank," and the acceptor of a bill where the acceptance is
"payable at a bank. "
It seems apparent that no one of these parties is injured in any way
by the delay in presentment so long as the drawee of the bill or check (or
the payor bank at which the note and acceptance were payable), remains
solvent. It is equally apparent that all three suffer in precisely the same
way and to the same extent upon insolvency of drawee and payor bank if
they are maintaining adequate funds with the drawee or payor bank.
0UCC
§ 3-407.
"119 Mont.
581, 179 P.2d 750 (1947).
6R.C.M. 1947, § 55-502.

UNIL § 186, (R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1703).

UNIL § 70 (R.C.M. 1947, § 55701).
65Ibid.
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The rule that limits the discharge of the drawer of a check to the extent of his loss, which traces back to a decision by Chancellor Kent of New
York about 1802, is justified on the grounds that otherwise the drawer
would be unjustly enriched. It would seem that the drawer of a bill is
likewise unjustly enriched by his total discharge if the bill has not been
"accepted" by the drawee.
In actual practice a difficulty has developed in the application of
the check rule because the drawer of the check is generally sued before the
liquidation of the insolvent bank determines the extent of the loss.
The Code section 3-501 provides a simple and practical solution. In
circumstances involving a loss, as above described, anyone in any of the
three categories is discharged from all liability to the holder if, but only
if, he makes an assignment to the holder of his funds with the payor sufficient to cover the item. Both the ultimate loss and the delay in ascertaining it is thus thrown upon the holder whose failure to make due presentment was the cause of the nonpayment.
Blackwelder v. Fergus Motor Company' involved a problem of negligent presentment which was treated as equivalent to delay. The maker of
a note secured by a chattel mortgage sent his check to cover. It could have
been presented to the drawee, although in a different town, on the next
business day; but instead the payee deposited it for collection, and the
collecting bank presented it by mail direct to the drawee. The bank failed
and did not pay the check. The trial court granted the drawer a perpetual
injunction against foreclosing the mortgage securing the note. The decision
amounts to a total discharge of the drawer of the check, and it was affirmed
on appeal. Several propositions invite comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code.
(1) To present the check in this manner was negligent, the court
said, if made with knowledge of the drawee's precarious condition. For the
mere delay consequent upon this method no harm was done, for the drawee
continued for five days after receipt to pay items presented over the counter
while ignoring those received by mail. However, in the light of knowledge
it was negligent not to present the check over the counter and this resulted
in a loss. To the extent that the court relies upon this ground for a total
release of the drawer it affords the holder no ready remedy to salvage from
the wreck such percentage, if any, as the failed bank might eventually pay.
Under the Code, as discussed above, the holder would be entitled to a pro
tanto assignment.
(2)
Whether or not the payee knew of the bank's failing condition
when it started the collection process it did later know of the dishonor in
time to give notice to the drawer, the court said. Under UNIL section 98'
failure to give notice works a total release of the drawer, whereas under
UNIL section 186' an improper delay in making presentment leads to a
pro tanto release only. Under section 3-502 of the Code failure to give
notice of dishonor in such a case as this would be treated exactly the same
as improper delay in making presentment, that is, the drawer would be
1180 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734 (1927).
T

R.C.M. 1947, § 55-810.

-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1703,
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released if he assigned to the holder credit with the bank sufficient to cover
the check. This would avoid an unjust enrichment of the drawer to the
extent that the failed bank eventually paid.
(3) The Montana court also thought that the drawee had "accepted"
the check, creating a debtor-creditor relationship between drawee and holder and discharging that relationship which had existed between drawer and
drawee. It invoked UNIL section 136' which gives the drawee twenty-four
hours within which to decide whether to "accept."
Of course this check
was presented for payment and not acceptance, but the section has been so
applied. Then the court invoked UNIL section 137," which also is concerned with presentment for acceptance and not payment, and provides
for what is known as "constructive acceptance" if the drawee of a bill
"refuses" to return it within the time provided. To find that there was a
"refusal" in the instant case it would be necessary to find that the very
manner of presentment implied a request for a prompt return if the check
were not paid, and that the failure to so return was a refusal. A number
of courts have so reasoned. The doctrine of constructive acceptance is rejected by the Code. For a "refusal" to return the drawee would be liable
in conversion and not as acceptor." He would be liable, however, for the
face amount of the check."
NEW COVERAGE
The Imposter and the Embezzler
The UNIL does not handle well or completely certain situations in
which a loss caused by the fraud of one person must be allocated to one or
the other of two innocent persons. The recurrent situations are: (1) by
false pretenses made in person or by mail an impostor induces a drawer
to issue a check to him or his confederate; (2) a fraudulent agent, authorized to draw checks in the name of his employer, issues them to "dummy"
payees, intending to embezzle the proceeds; (3) essentially the same situation as (2) except that the fraudulent employee is the one who supplies
the name of the payees rather than the one who signs the check for the
drawer.
The only help the UNIL contributes to the solution of these problems
of allocation of loss is found in section 9(3)" which provides that an instrument is payable to "bearer" when (among other things) "it is payable
to a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." This takes care of the situation where the instrument is made payable to the order of "cash" or the "town pump;"
there no fraud is involved and it is just a question how to handle the matter. But where fraud is involved it is not a question whether the payee is
"non-existent" but whether he is intended to have an interest, and whose
intention is to control.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1105.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-1106.
-UCO § 3-419(1) (a).
"UCC § 3-419(2). See also, Cellars v. Dwinnel, 87 Mont 73, 285 Pac. 181 (1930).
7R.C.M. 1947, § 55-209. In 1931 Montana amended this provision. The effect will
be discussed infra, this section.
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It is a question of allocation of loss. If the check is found to be payable to bearer the loss falls on the drawer; if not, it falls on the innocent
purchaser (or drawee bank) who failed to get a proper and needed indorsement. In practice the loss has generally been thrown on the drawer
where the impostor appeared in person, with the cases more divided if the
fraud was by mail. In type (2) the loss has generally been thrown on the
drawer, the agent signing for him being found to be the "person making
it so payable." In type (3) the loss has been thrown on the innocent purchaser or drawee bank (except where an estoppel is found).
Section 3-405 throws the loss on the drawer in all three situations. In
the impostor situation he is the person first deceived and there is insufficient reason for shifting the loss to another. In the embezzler situations
the drawer is the one best able to protect himself by better personnel screening or by fidelity insurance. A further advantage of the Code is that it
answers the questions clearly.
In 1931 Montana adopted the American Bankers' Association amendment to UNIL section 9 (3)."' This provides substantially the same answer
as Code section 3-405 to problems (2) and (3) discussed above but it leaves
problem (1) without adequate answer.
Negligence Contributing to Alteration
Ever since the English case of Young v. Grote,'5 it has been recognized
as good bank law that the drawer of a check owes a duty to the drawee bank
not to draw a check so carelessly as to contribute to alteration. In that
case the amount was so written, both in words and figures, as to facilitate
raising from fifty to two hundred fifty pounds. The UNIL does not codify
the rule nor provide, directly or indirectly, for an exception to its blanket
rule that a material alteration avoids the instrument "except as against a
party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration, and
Nevertheless the rule continues in full force and
subsequent indorsers. ''
is justified by the courts on the grounds that the drawee bank owes a duty
to the depositor to pay his checks and this gives rise to a correlative duty
of the depositor to exercise care. There has been no general recognition
of a duty owing to the holder in due course. It is true that he owes no
"duty" to purchase but were it not for the fact that he does purchase the
negotiable instrument would lose much of its commercial value.
Code section 3-406 codifies the bank rule and extends its protection
to all drawees of drafts as well as checks, to certain other payors, and also
to the holder in due course. Within the limits the Code provides it seems
to us that this extension is wise and salutary.
The Accommodation Party and the Guarantor
The UNIL recognizes only four parties as incurring the obligation to
pay a negotiable instrument; these are: drawer, acceptor, maker and in7

"The amendment reads, "3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting or living person not intended to have any interest in it, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable, or known to his employee or other agent
who supplies the name of such payee."
7154 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
-UNIL § 124 (RC.M. 1947, § 55-906). See also UNIL § 125 (R.C.M. 1947, § 55-907).
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dorser. Any one of these may sign as an "accommodation" party. UNIL
provides that an accommodation party is one "who has signed . . . without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name
to some other person.""m
The definition is in part somewhat inept, but
it has caused little difficulty. Although the UNIL recognizes the existence
of the accommodation party it does not address itself directly to some of
the problems which beset him. Two will be considered, together with the
Code treatment.
If the accommodated party negotiates the instrument only after maturity, although he does so in general for the purpose for which it was
created, there is a question whether the accommodation party should become
liable at all. The courts have divided upon the question. Pulling in one
direction is the accommodation party's right to be exonerated at maturity;
pulling in the other direction is the fact that in a general way the original
purpose is being served. Code section 3-415(2) resolves the question in
favor of his right to be exonerated at maturity. Accordingly he does not
become liable unless the instrument is negotiated before maturity.
The other question is whether the accommodation party, when and if
he pays, is entitled to recover reimbursement from the principal debtor (the
aecommodated party) in an action brought oa the instrument, with the advantages that gives him, or only upon an implied in fact contract." Again
the courts are divided. All rely upon UNIL section 121." Some rely upon
one part of the section to reach one result; others stress another part and
reach a different result. The section is ambiguous. But whatever dusky
light it may throw on the question if the acommodation party is drawer or
ilidorser, it provides no light whatever if he is maker or acceptor. Code
section 3-415(5) unambiguously gives him recourse on the instrument he
has paid.
The 1TNlIl does not recognize the guarantor although a fair proportion of all guarantv. are writi en on negotiable notes. In legal contemplation the guaranty might as well he written on a separate paper except that
if written on the instrument it passes by awssignment on transfer of the
instrument. Under the 11NIL there can be no holder in due course of a
guaranty. Of course the guarantor may also be an indorser and in that
case the holder in due course may recover from him free of defenses.
Code section 3-416 welcomes the guarantor to the fold as a party to
the negotiable instrument and prescribes rules governing both guaranty of
payment and guaranty of collectibility. The rules are those generally accepted at common law but the Code adds clarification and certainty. The
Code provides for the exception recognized in Beitler v. Rudkin' that judgment against the principal debtor is not a condition to suit against the
guarantor of collectibility if the principal's insolvency is otherwise demonstrated. By making the guarantor a technical party to the negotiable instrument the Code resolves all questions as to the rights of the holder in
"UNIL § 29, (R.C.M. 1947, § 55-306).

"Anderson v. Border, 75 Mont. 516, 244 Pac. 494, 499 (1926), has dictum to this
effect. The court also said that one who would have been an anomalous indorser
had he signed before delivery of the note would be a guarantor if he signed after
delivery.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 55-903.
'104 Conn. 404, 133 Atl. 214 (1926).
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due course against him. At the same time he himself is assured that his
recourse against his principal may be on the instrumeut with consequent
advantages to him.'
Warranty On Presentment
Warranty grew out of the action of deceit but it is now regarded as
a matter of contract incident to a sale. Except for the case of the anomalous indorser, all warranties under the UNIL' are made by transferors,
and without exception they all run to holders only. The warranties do not
run to a drawee to whom the instrument is presented for payment (or
acceptance) ; the drawee is not a purchaser or a holder. For the same
reason no warranty runs to the maker of a note. Therefore, the party
making presentment for payment does not warrant the genuineness of any
indorsement, not even of an indorsement which is necessary to his own title
and to his right to receive payment. The UNIL provides the drawee no
remedy in such a case. However the common law does come to his rescue.
If the party receiving payment knew a necessary indorsement was forged
the drawee may recover in an action of deceit; even if the party receiving
payment did not know of the forgery the drawee may recover in an action
"for money paid under mistake of fact." But the latter remedy does not
enable the drawee to reach any prior holder though he indorsed after the
forgery.
Of course if the forgery was of the signature of the drawer (or acceptor
or maker) the payor cannot recover because of the doctrine of Price v.
Neal,' which allocates that risk to the party making payment, except in
case of fraud.
Montana has somewhat anticipated the position taken by article 3.
In First National Bank of Miles City v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis' the court explained its decision in favor of a drawee against a
collecting bank on the theory that the latter by presenting the check had
impliedly warranted all prior indorsements. Code section 3-417 develops
this idea further and creates a warranty, new so far as statutes are concerned, which runs to the drawee. It is made by anyone receiving payment and also by prior indorsers who indorsed after the trouble developed.
It is a warranty of all necessary indorsements and also that the instrument
has not been altered. There is also a warranty of good faith even with
respect to matters covered by the doctrine of Price v. Neal, above. This
section also covers fully the Price v. Neal doctrine with proper limitations,
whereas UNIL section 62' covers only one part of it, and leaves the rest
'In Square Butte State Bank v. Ballard, 64 Mont. 554, 210 Pac. 889 (1922), it was
held that one who guaranteed payment and also collectibility of a note did not incur an obligation for the "direct" payment of money within the meaning of the
attachment statute. Query whether article 3 would necessarily change this. However, in Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Sparrow, 29 Mont. 132, 74 Pac. 197 (1903)
on which the court relied, it is indicated that California and Colorado reached a
different result under the same attachment statute. Article 3 does not make a
guarantor an indorser, but it does make him a party to the instrument and defines
his obligations.
-UNIL §§ 65, 66 (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 55-606, -607).
'3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). Price v. Neal is partially codified in
UNIL § 62 (R.C.M. 1947, § 55-603).

'88 Mont. 589, 294 Pac. 1105 (1931).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 55-603.
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to decisional law. One of the important advantages afforded him by the
Code is that he (the party making payment) is no longer restricted in his
recovery to the party receiving payment.
Conditional and Absolute Payment
The UNIL does not cover the question whether an instrument is given
and received in absolute payment or in conditional payment. At common
law if an instrument is taken in absolute payment of an underlying obligation and the instrument is not paid, the obligee has recourse only upon the
instrument and necessarily only against parties liable thereon. On the
other hand, if it is taken in conditional payment and is not paid, the obligee
has his choice of recourse upon the instrument or upon the underlying obligation. The intention of the parties controls but generally it is not expressed. In most situations, except where the instrument bears the obligation of a bank, the great majority of the states, including Connecticut.
finds a presumption that the instrument was taken in conditional payment. Montana has recognized this presumption in United States Bank of
Red Lodge v. Shupak.'
Code section 3-802 codifies and clarifies the majority common law
view. Presumptively the instrument is taken in absolute payment if a
bank is obligated upon it; in all other cases if there is an underlying obligation the presumption is that the instrument is taken in conditional
payment. Had this section of the Code been in force the decision should
have been otherwise in Tuckel v. Jurovaty,' where it would seem that both
court and counsel went astray.'
The Non-negotiable Instrument
The Code fills a gap which has long been in need of codification.
The UNIL by its terms applies only to negotiable instruments. In between
the negotiable instrument and the simple contract lies the non-negotiable
commercial instrument. The law governing such an instrument is difficult
to find in decisional law and is shrouded in some uncertainty.
The principal difference in form between the negotiable and the nonnegotiable commercial instrument is that the latter does not have the socalled words of negotiability, that is, it is not payable "to order" or "to
bearer." If the instrument is held non-negotiable for any other reason it
is likely to be considered merely a simple contract. The rules of the UNIL
have often been applied by analogy and if the instrument contains a condition not suitable to the negotiable instrument, or if the sum is not stated
with sufficient certainty, or if it does not meet the requirements as to certainty of time of payment, then the instrument is likely to be regarded as
not only non-negotiable but not even a "non-negotiable commercial instrument;" in other words it is a simple contract and nothing more. In the
present state of the law even this cannot be said to be certain. In Mechanics
Bank v. Johnson' a note was said to be non-negotiable because it imposed
upon the maker the obligation to pay any taxes which might be levied upon
'54 Mont. 542, 172 Pac. 324 (1918).
'141 Conn. 649, 109 A.2d 260 (1954).
'8See Comment, 29 CoNN. B. J. 361 (1955).
'104 Conn. 696, 134 Ad. 231 (1926).
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the note; this was thought to render the sum "uncertain."
(Later the
statute was amended to cover the situation.) However, it seemed to be regarded as a non-negotiable note and not merely a simple contract. This
distinction has been drawn in the application of the statute of limitations.
In Connecticut the negotiable note and the simple contract are governed
by the six year statute of limitations, whereas the non-negotiable note and
the sealed instrument are governed by a seventeen year statute of limitations. '
There is a limit to what can be done by way of analogy. Thus in
•Jarvis v. Wilson" it was held that an oral acceptance of a non-negotiable
bill of exchange was effective although a statute had already required
written acceptance of a negotiable bill. This statute could not be applied
by analogy. However, in all other respects the court applied the rules
which would have applied had the bill been negotiable." There are a number of situations in which the law in this field is uncertain in Connecticut.
The Code resolves the uncertainties. Section 3-805 makes the entire
article 3 applicable to all instruments which are non-negotiable solely because they are not payable "to order" or "to bearer," save only that there
cannot be a "holder in due course." In this way the Code provides a complete set of rules governing the non-negotiable commercial instrument. It
provides a guide which has been sorely needed.
Specifically, the enactment of article 3 in Montana would affect the
present Montana law in these respects, at least:
(a) The line between the negotiable instrument, the non-negotiable
commercial instrument and the simple contract would be clearly drawn as
discussed above.
(b) All the rules of article 3 would apply to the non-negotiable commercial instrument except that there could be no holder in due course.
The rights of a holder of such instruments would be the same as the rights
of a holder of negotiable instruments if he failed to qualify as a holder in
due course." He would be subject to all defenses which would be available
in an action on a simple contract. So far as the maker is concerned this
is the same as is provided in R.C.M. 1947, section 58-303. That statute is
not concerned with defenses of other parties because under present Montana law indorsers of non-negotiable instruments "warrant'" but they
do not promise, conditionally or otherwise, that the instrument will be
paid.'
(c) The transferor-indorser of a non-negotiable commercial instrument would incur the obligations of indorsers of negotiable instruments,
that is, he would promise conditionally to pay the instrument, but, like
the maker, he would be entitled to assert defenses against the holder.
(d) The warranties of the transferor under article 3 would vary
"'This problem would not arise in Montana where the statute of limitations Is the
same for all obligations founded upon an instrument in writing. R.C.M. 1947, §

93-2603.
'46 Conn. 90, 33 Am. Rep. 18 (1878).
"See
also Windsor Cement Co. v. Thompson, 86 Conn. 511, 86 Atl. 1 (1913).
9
UCC § 3-306.
-R.C.M.
1947, § 74-320.
'
Newer v. First National Bank of Harlem, 74 Mont. 549,241 Pac. 613 (1923).
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somewhat from those under present law. Under R.C.M. 1947, section
74-320 the transferor warrants "that he has no knowledge of any facts
which tend to prove it worthless," whereas under Code section 3-417 some
of the warranties go beyond mere want of knowledge.
These are some of the clarifications, changes and extended coverage
which have persuaded the writer that article 3 covers the field of commercial paper in a manner superior to the UNIL.
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